The determinants of the composition of public debt in developing and emerging market countries  by Forslund, Kristine et al.
Ab
c
i
b
©
J
K
1
t
o
e
t
r
t
k
p
a
c
l
1
A
P
A
dAvailable online at www.sciencedirect.com
Review of Development Finance 1 (2011) 207–222
The determinants of the composition of public debt in developing and
emerging market countries
Kristine Forslund a,∗, Lycia Lima b, Ugo Panizza a
a Debt and Development Finance Branch, United Nations on Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva, Switzerland
b Department of Economics of PUC, Rio de Janerio, Brazil
Available online 19 October 2011
bstract
This paper uses a new dataset on the composition of public debt in developing and emerging market countries to look at the correlation
etween country characteristics and domestic debt share. While the paper finds that most variables have the expected sign, it also finds that
ountry characteristics cannot explain regional differences in the composition of public debt. Moreover, the paper finds a weak correlation between
nflationary history and the composition of public debt. The paper explores the determinants of this finding and shows that the results are driven
y the presence of capital controls.
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. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to document recent trends in
he composition of public debt across a large sample of devel-
ping and emerging market countries and test whether there are
mpirical regularities that explain the choice between domes-
ic and external public debt. Our analysis yields two surprising
esults. First, contrary to what is found by several studies on
he determinants of bond market development in emerging mar-
et countries, we find that our large set of control variables
lays a limited role in explaining cross-country differences in the
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.omposition of public debt. Second, we find that inflationary his-
ory has no statistically significant effect on the composition of
ublic debt. In particular, we do not find evidence that countries
ith a history of high inflation have lower shares of domesti-
ally issued debt. When we look carefully at this latter result,
e find that it is driven by the presence of capital controls. We
how that in countries with high levels of capital controls there
s no statistically significant correlation between domestic debt
hare and inflationary history. However, in countries with low
nd intermediate levels of capital controls, we find that inflation-
ry history has a negative and statistically significant impact on
omestic debt share. This suggests that capital controls have a
egative effect on the development of the domestic debt market
n countries characterized by high policy credibility but may help
eveloping the domestic bond market in countries characterized
y low policy credibility.1
We are not the first to study the determinants of debt compo-
ition in developing and emerging countries. However, previous
esearch focused on bonded debt and restricted the analysis to
he 27 emerging market countries covered by the Bank of Inter-
ational Settlements (BIS) survey on domestic securities. To the
1 Of course this positive effect is likely to vanish if countries that impose
apital controls continue to adopt irresponsible policies. However, in countries
hat are seriously committed to improve policy credibility, capital controls can
e considered as an additional policy instruments in building a local debt market.
or a discussion of financial repressions see Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011).
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Domestic public debt is not a new phenomenon for devel-
oping countries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) collect data on08 K. Forslund et al. / Review of De
est of our knowledge, our paper is the first that covers a large
ample of countries. Four papers that are closely related to our
ork are Burger and Warnock (2006), Claessens et al. (2007),
ichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), and Borensztein
t al. (2008).
Burger and Warnock (2006) were the first to use BIS data on
omestic securities to study the determinants of local bond mar-
et development (they use both private and public sector bonds).
heir sample covers up to 49 countries and includes 27 emerging
arket countries and 22 advanced economies. The main findings
f Burger and Warnock are that policies and institutions play an
mportant role in the development of the local government bond
arket. In particular, they find that low inflation, rule of law, and
ountry size are positively correlated with the development of
he domestic government bond market and that the fiscal balance
nd GDP growth are negatively correlated with the size of the
overnment bond market.
While Burger and Warnock work with cross-sectional data,
laessens et al. (2007) use panel data to study the determinants
f the development of the market for local currency govern-
ent bonds. Their sample (which is also based on BIS data)
overs up to 36 countries (of which 12 are emerging markets
nd the remaining are advanced economies) for the 1993–2000
eriod. Their results are consistent with those of Burger and
arnock (2006). In particular, they find that country size, size
f the banking system (as measured by total deposits over GDP),
ood institutions, low inflation, flexible exchange rates, and fis-
al burden are positively correlated with the size of the domestic
ond market. In addition, they find that countries with flexible
xchange rates tend to have larger domestic bond markets.
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) also use panel
ata techniques and BIS data to study the determinants of domes-
ic bond market capitalization in 41 countries over the period
990–2001 (they do not restrict their analysis to government
onds and include all types of issuers). Compared to Claessens
t al. (2007), Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) use a
arger set of controls and confirm the finding that country size and
nstitutional quality are positively associated with the develop-
ent of the domestic bond market. Contrary to Claessens et al.
2007), however, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004)
nd that lower exchange rate volatility is positively correlated
ith the size of the domestic bond market and argue that this
ight be due to the fact that a fixed exchange rate lowers cur-
ency risk and may encourage foreign participation. They also
nd that countries without capital controls tend to have larger
ond markets.
Borensztein et al. (2008) build upon Eichengreen and
uengnaruemitchai (2004) but expand their sample and distin-
uish between the determinants of the development of markets
n government, corporate and financial sector bonds, rather
han considering the bond market as a single aggregate. More-
ver, their analysis uses a difference-in-differences methodology
uitable for identifying the differential effects of country char-
cteristics on the development of different segments of the bond
arket. Finally, they run separate regressions for emerging mar-
ets. In line with previous studies, Borensztein et al. (2008) find
hat country size is significantly correlated with the size of bond
e
gment Finance 1 (2011) 207–222
arket but that the relationship is non-linear. In addition, they
nd that bond market development is positively correlated with
rade openness, total public debt, institutional quality, lack of
apital controls, and the privatization of the pension system.
ith respect to interest rates, they find that the level of the
omestic interest rate is negatively correlated with market cap-
talization but that there is no significant correlation between
anking spreads and the size of the government bond market.
hen they focus on a sub-sample of 21 emerging market coun-
ries, Borensztein et al. (2008) find that country size no longer
ppears to matter and that the positive effect of public debt
ecomes much smaller.
There are three differences between our paper and the four
apers discussed above. The first difference relates to the defini-
ion of public debt. The previous papers focused on bond market
evelopment while we focus on total public debt.
The second difference is in regard to country coverage. The
apers discussed above examine a relatively small group of
merging market countries, whereas our paper covers up 95
eveloping countries, of which 33 are low-income countries.
oreover, the analysis of the previous papers jointly included
eveloping and industrial countries (with the partial exception
f Borensztein et al. (2008) and one may suspect that most of
he variance in bond market development was driven by the
ifference between these two groups of countries. Accordingly
e address this issue in this paper by focusing exclusively on
eveloping countries.
The third difference relates to the methodology. While previ-
us studies either focused on cross-country differences (Burger
nd Warnock, 2006) or jointly looked at cross-country and within
ountries differences, our battery of statistical tests also use
xed effect estimations which allows for the isolation of the
eterminants of changes within countries.
. Data and trends
Lack of reliable data has been the main obstacle to the anal-
sis of the composition of public debt in developing countries.
n this paper, we use a new public debt dataset (assembled by
anizza, 2008) which aims to capture both the domestic and
xternal component of public debt. This new dataset consists of
n unbalanced panel of 1558 observations covering 104 devel-
ping countries for the 1990–2007 period (Table 1 shows the
overage of the dataset by year and region).2 In the remainder
f this paper we use a subset of the original dataset based on an
lmost balanced panel that covers developing countries for the
994–2006 period.
.1. Trends2 Most of the data refer to central government debt, but when central gov-
rnment debt data were not available, Panizza (2008) used data for the general
overnment and the non-financial public sector.
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Table 1
Countries included in the domestic debt dataset.
Year EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA Total
1990 10 2 23 5 7 20 67
1991 10 4 24 6 7 21 72
1992 11 7 25 6 7 21 77
1993 11 9 25 7 7 22 81
1994 11 11 25 7 7 24 85
1995 12 15 25 7 7 24 90
1996 13 16 26 7 7 25 94
1997 13 17 26 7 7 26 96
1998 14 21 26 7 7 28 103
1999 14 21 26 8 7 27 103
2000 13 22 26 9 7 27 104
2001 12 23 26 9 7 27 104
2002 12 23 26 9 7 26 103
2003 12 22 26 9 7 26 102
2004 12 21 26 9 7 25 100
2005 11 21 26 9 7 23 97
2006 9 19 22 6 4 7 67
2007 6 13 14 3 2 5 43
Total 206 287 443 130 118 404 1588
Regional classifications (in line with World Bank regional classifications): EAP, East Asia and Pacific; ECA, Europe and Central Asia; LAC, Latin America and the
Caribbean; MNA, Middle East and Northern Africa; SAS, South Asia; SSA, Sub Saharan Africa. The income classification is the same as in the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
Table 2
Public debt composition in developing countries.
1994 1999 2005
DD/Y ED/Y TD/Y DD/TD DD/Y ED/Y TD/Y DD/TD DD/Y ED/Y TD/Y DD/TD
Simple average
EAP 0.13 0.46 0.58 0.30 0.13 0.43 0.55 0.34 0.15 0.35 0.50 0.38
ECA 0.17 0.28 0.46 0.35 0.15 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.17 0.19 0.36 0.43
LAC 0.14 0.58 0.72 0.24 0.17 0.39 0.56 0.33 0.23 0.39 0.62 0.40
MNA 0.42 0.49 0.91 0.45 0.36 0.42 0.78 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.73 0.56
SAS 0.25 0.35 0.60 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.33 0.64 0.47
SSA 0.20 0.84 1.05 0.25 0.33 0.78 1.12 0.32 0.25 0.67 0.92 0.30
Total 0.19 0.55 0.75 0.30 0.22 0.47 0.69 0.35 0.23 0.40 0.64 0.40
Weighted average
EAP 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.46 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.71 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.80
ECA 0.27 0.29 0.56 0.46 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.45 0.20 0.14 0.34 0.50
LAC 0.15 0.21 0.36 0.40 0.25 0.22 0.47 0.49 0.30 0.14 0.44 0.66
MNA 0.54 0.54 1.08 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.77 0.48 0.40 0.26 0.66 0.59
SAS 0.40 0.14 0.55 0.77 0.44 0.11 0.55 0.81 0.55 0.08 0.63 0.87
SSA 0.43 0.36 0.79 0.73 0.38 0.33 0.71 0.67 0.26 0.19 0.45 0.65
Total 0.22 0.21 0.43 0.48 0.24 0.19 0.43 0.59 0.27 0.11 0.39 0.69
T nd th
d
d
t
a
s
t
t
t
p
i
y
p
phe 1994 average covers 85 countries, the 1999 average covers 103 countries a
ebt; TD = total debt; Y = year.
omestic public debt for a large sample of countries going back
o the 19th century. Their sample shows that domestic debt
ccounts for almost two thirds of total public debt. They also
how that the accumulation of a large domestic debt is often at
he roots of external debt crisis and large inflationary episode.3 In
his paper we use the data assembled by Panizza (2008) which
3 Guidotti and Kumar (1991) study the case of 15 emerging market coun-
ries and show that their domestic public debt-to-GDP ratio went from 10
er cent in 1981 to 16 per cent in 1988. Christensen (2005) shows that low-
ncome countries also have a tradition of domestic borrowing (in his sample of
o
l
c
o
b
S
Ge 2007 average covers 97 countries, where DD = domestic debt; ED = external
ields lower but still substantial domestic debt share. The top
anel of Table 2 shows that over the 1994–2005 period domestic
ublic debt increased slightly from 19 to 23 per cent of devel-
ping countries’ GDP. This trend occurred while average debt
evels were decreasing from 75 to 64 per cent of developing
ountries’ GDP. As a consequence, the share of domestic debt
ver total public debt increased from 30 to 40 per cent. The
ottom panel of Table 2 reports weighted averages and shows
ub-Saharan African countries, domestic public debt was about 10 per cent of
DP in 1980).
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Fig. 1. Composition of public debt in developing countries, average debt to GDP.
The number of countries included in the average ranges between 67 (2006) and
104 (2000–2001).
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Fig. 2. Share of domestic public debt over total public debt (simple average).
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cannot make any claim that our estimations uncover a causal
relationship going from the explanatory variables to debt com-
position. The second caveat relates to the fact that supply andimple averages vary in terms of country coverage, with the years 1994, 1999,
nd 2005 including 85, 103 and 97 countries, respectively.
hat the switch to domestic borrowing is even more important
n larger countries. In this case, the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio
ncreased from 22 to 27 per cent, and the share of domestic debt
ver total debt increased from 48 to 69 per cent.
Fig. 1 plots the evolution of public debt in the developing
orld and shows a net decrease in total debt which is mostly
riven by lower external debt. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of
he simple average of the share of domestic debt over total
ebt across 6 regions.4 In general, the share of domestic debt
ncreased in most regions of the world. Only in Sub-Saharan
frica did the share of domestic debt decrease slightly over
999–2005, but also in this region domestic debt went from 25
er cent of total public debt in 1994 to 30 per cent in 2005.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the share of domes-
ic debt to total debt. The top panel of the table presents the
ummary statistics for all available data, whereas the bottom
anel presents the summary statistics for the observations used
n the regressions of Section 3. By and large, the two samples
4 Regions are broken down by World Bank regional classifications, which
ncludes: East Asia and Pacific (EAP);Europe and Central Asia (ECA); Latin
merica and the Caribbean (LAC); Middle East and Northern Africa (MNA);
outh Asia (SAS), Sub Saharan Africa (SSA).
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ave similar characteristics.5 As already highlighted in Fig. 2
nd Table 2, the Middle East & Northern Africa, East Asia &
acific, and Europe & Central Asia are the regions with the
ighest shares of domestic public debt while Latin America &
he Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa are the regions with the
owest shares of domestic debt. In examining income groups,
e find that middle-income countries have an average domestic
ebt share of 37 per cent and low-income countries have a much
ower domestic debt share of about 20 per cent. If we look across
eriods, we find that the share of domestic debt increased from
7 per cent in the first half of the 1990s to 35 per cent in the first
ix years of the 21st century.
. The determinants of debt composition
In this section, we estimate the determinants of public debt
omposition by regressing domestic public debt (measured as
share of total public debt) over a set of country characteris-
ics. We estimate our model using both random effects and fixed
ffects models. We also test for differences across groups of
ountries by splitting the sample between low-income develop-
ng countries and middle-income developing countries.
Our control variables can be classified into five different cate-
ories: (i) macroeconomic imbalances; (ii) country size and level
f development; (iv) crises and external shocks; (v) openness;
nd (iv) exchange rate regime. The first category includes infla-
ion, current account balance, government balance, total public
ebt and its square, and exchange rate misalignment. The sec-
nd category includes GDP, GDP per capita, M2 over GDP, and
orruption. The third category includes a banking crisis dummy,
sovereign default dummy, a dummy that captures sudden debt
xplosions, a dummy that captures sudden debt reductions, the
rowth rate of the real exchange rate, and a terms of trade index.
he fourth category includes a measure of de facto trade open-
ess and a measure of de jure capital account openness.6 Finally,
n all regressions we control for global factors by including year
xed effects. In the random effects regressions we also include
set of regional dummies, where East Asia & Pacific is the
xcluded dummy.
Before describing our set of explanatory variables in greater
etail, we should clarify that there are at least two caveats in our
nalysis. The first caveat concerns causality. Although we use
agged values of the explanatory variables and thus ensure that
hese are predetermined with respect to debt composition, we5 The only differences are in the ECA and SAS regions and in the 2000–2006
ub-periods. In these three groups we find that the sub-samples included in the
egressions have slightly higher domestic debt shares (with differences that range
etween 2 and 3 percentage points).
6 We measure the exchange rate regime using the de facto indicators assembled
y Levy et al. (2005) and use a dummy that takes value one in countries with a
xed exchange rate regime and a dummy that takes value one in counties with
n intermediate exchange rate regime (floating exchange rate is the excluded
ummy).
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Table 3
Summary statistics: domestic debt/total debt.
Group μ (%) σ (%) Median (%) Min (%) Max (%) N. of observations
Panel A: all observations
All countries 31.93 24.56 27.48 0 100 1588
By region
EAP 37.38 31.98 35.90 0 93.68 206
ECA 35.98 23.41 32.58 0 97.32 287
LAC 27.48 20.05 25.60 0 87.30 443
MNA 41.93 21.71 38.79 3.04 91.53 130
SAS 34.34 13.77 36.01 1.71 56.95 118
SSA 27.56 26.29 18.96 0 100 404
By income groups
Middle-income 37.29 24.88 34.50 0 98.39 1084
Low-income 20.37 19.34 15.96 0 100 504
By period
1990–1995 27.04 23.87 22.12 0 98.39 472
1996–2000 32.02 24.21 27.54 0 100 504
2000–2006 35.03 24.73 30.60 0 100 572
Panel B: observations included in the regressions
All countries 32.30 24.45 28.18 0 100 1122
By region
EAP 37.30 31.09 35.79 0 91.40 129
ECA 38.94 23.41 36.66 0 93.84 203
LAC 27.75 20.45 25.66 0 87.30 368
MNA 41.93 18.02 40.78 11.59 80.47 67
SAS 37.13 12.28 41.27 1.85 56.95 66
SSA 27.89 27.50 17.35 0 100 289
By income groups
Middle-income 37.60 24.59 35.57 0 98.39 798
Low-income 19.26 18.51 15.00 0 100 324
By period
1990–1995 26.32 22.64 22.40 0 98.39 305
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2000–2006 37.06 24.88 32.15
emand effects often go in opposite directions. Thus, it is hard to
ave a clear prediction on the relationship between our explana-
ory and dependent variables. Even with these caveats in mind,
n some cases it should be possible to indicate which effects are
xpected to prevail and we will do so whenever possible. It is also
mportant to acknowledge that even though our data can only dis-
inguish between domestic and external debt and do not contain
ny information on currency composition, we will often justify
ur choice of explanatory variables using arguments based on
urrency composition. We do this because the share of domes-
ic currency instruments in domestic debt is substantially higher
han the domestic currency share of external debt, in fact the
atter is often zero (see Eichengreen et al., 2005). Thus, place of
ssuance is often a good proxy for currency composition, though
his is not always the case (see Panizza, 2008).Our main measure of macroeconomic instability is log of
nflation (Ln(INF)).7 There are two reasons why we expect a neg-
tive relationship between inflation and domestic debt share.8
7 We use logs in order to be able to interpret the results as semi-elasticities. In
rder to deal with negative values we use the transformation LINF = Ln(1 + INF).
8 Burger and Warnock (2006) and the other authors quoted in the introduction
nd that a history of high inflation is detrimental for the development of the
omestic bond market.
l
q
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c
m0 100 391
0 100 351
irst, high inflation increases uncertainty which, other things
qual, should increase the cost of issuing on the domestic mar-
et (unless all domestic debt is indexed to either prices or foreign
urrency).9 Second, a government with a history of high infla-
ion may need to issue foreign currency debt in order to credibly
ignal its commitment to pursuing a strong and stable mone-
ary policy (Calvo, 1988). There are also mechanisms that may
ead to a positive correlation between inflation and domestic
ebt share. Think, for instance, of a country that is facing a real
ppreciation (i.e., where inflation is higher than currency depre-
iation) and where a large share of domestic debt is indexed to
nflation. In this case, valuation effects will create a positive link
etween inflation and domestic currency debt. We believe this
o be a fairly exceptional case and so expect that, in the absence
f financial repression, the first two effects will dominate the
atter. In fact Burger and Warnock (2006) and the other authors
uoted in the introduction all find a negative correlation between
nflation and the development of the domestic bond market.The relationship between current account balance (CA/GDP)
nd domestic debt share should be straightforward because
ountries that are running a current account surplus do not
9 Even in this case, inflation can debase debt indexed to prices if the govern-
ent tinkers with the price index.
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with high credibility and a positive effect in countries with low
credibility.
10 This discussion does not fit the official definition of external debt because12 K. Forslund et al. / Review of De
eed to borrow abroad. Hence, we expect a positive relationship
etween domestic debt share and current account balance. The
elationship between domestic debt share and the government
alance (GBAL/GDP) is uncertain. On the supply side, countries
hich are running large deficits and have limited access to the
nternational capital market may need to issue more domestic
ebt. On the demand side, large deficits may lead to inflationary
ressure (Sargent and Wallace, 1981), reduce credibility, and
hus reduce the demand for domestic currency debt.
The relationship between the level of debt (DEBT/GDP) and
omestic debt share is also uncertain but we expect a positive and
on-linear relationship between these two variables. Countries
ith a larger stock of debt will have more of an incentive to
reate the plumbing for a well-working market for domestic
ebt. However, when debt becomes too large, countries will have
ncentives to inflate away their debt obligations and this may
ave an adverse effect on the demand for domestic debt.
Exchange rate misalignments (RER MIS) also have oppo-
ite demand, supply, and valuation effects. On the demand
ide, at any given interest rate, a depreciated exchange rate
is-à-vis its equilibrium level is likely to foster the demand of
omestic currency bonds as investors may foresee an ex-post
eterioration of the foreign currency rate (a real appreciation
f local currency). On the supply side, governments might be
ess likely to issue in domestic currency in presence of a depre-
iated exchange rate for the same reason why investors are
nterested in domestic bonds. Clearly, these considerations are
alid for any given interest rates. However, if expectations on
uture movements of the exchange rate are symmetric, we should
xpect Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) to hold. In this case,
he interest rate would adjust to equalize expected returns on
omestic and foreign currency debt. Even if UIP holds, coun-
ries may find easier to issue domestic debt when the currency is
ppreciating because the expected appreciation allows prudent
olicymakers to hide the implicit insurance premium embedded
n domestic currency borrowing (Caballero and Cowan, 2006;
anizza, 2008). However, UIP does not normally hold in prac-
ice and activities such as carry trade can lead to a situation
n which currency appreciation goes hand in hand with high
nterest rates. Finally, an appreciating exchange rate will auto-
atically lead to higher domestic debt share through valuation
ffects.
The expected signs for our second set of explanatory vari-
bles are unambiguous. In particular, we expect country size
measured by the log of total GDP, Ln(GDP), GDP per capita
Ln(GDP PC), the size of the financial system (M2/GDP), and
nstitutional quality (measured by the lack of corruption, CORR)
o be positively correlated with domestic debt share.
The effect of crises and external shocks is, instead, uncertain.
anking crises are often resolved by issuing domestic bonds.
his suggests a positive correlation between the banking crisis
ummy (BANKCRS) and the share of domestic debt. However,
ountries with a small financial sector may not be able to place
omestically the large amount of debt which may be necessary
o bail out the banking system. Thus, banking crises could be
ositively correlated with domestic debt share in middle-income
ountries with bigger financial sectors and negatively correlated
d
e
i
2ment Finance 1 (2011) 207–222
ith domestic debt share in low-income countries with smaller
nancial sectors.
As countries in default are generally unable to place exter-
al debt, we should find a positive correlation between the
efault dummy (DEFAULT) and domestic debt share. How-
ver, as defaults are often preceded by large accumulations of
xternal debt, it is possible that reverse causality will lead us to
nd a negative relationship between these two variables. Sud-
en debt contractions are often driven by debt relief and debt
escheduling. Since most relief and rescheduling episodes relate
o external debt, we expect a positive relationship between the
ebt contraction (DEBTCONTR) dummy and domestic debt
hare. Sudden debt explosions are often driven by valuation
ffects linked to currency depreciations (Campos et al., 2006)
nd by skeletons. The first effect would lead to a decrease in the
omestic debt share and the second is usually associated with
n increase in the domestic debt share, skeletons are often dealt
ith by issuing domestic bonds (see Fernandez et al., 2008, for
discussion of the case of Argentina). As we are already con-
rolling for the first effect by including the change of the real
xchange rate (DRER), which we expect to be negatively cor-
elated with domestic debt share), we expect to find that the
ebt explosion (DEBTEXPL) dummy is positively correlated
ith domestic debt share. As positive external shocks reduce the
eed of external resources and hence we expect to find a positive
orrelation between terms of trade (DTOT) and domestic debt
hare.
Finally, we do not have clear expectations for the relation-
hip between domestic debt share and the two measures of
penness. Let us start with trade openness. On the one hand,
ore open countries suffer less from balance sheets effects
ssociated with external borrowing (Calvo et al., 2003) and
hus we should expect a negative relationship between trade
penness and domestic debt share. On the other hand, more
pen countries may be more successful in attracting foreign
nvestors into the domestic financial market, bringing about a
ositive association between trade openness and domestic debt
hare. The first effect may be dominant in low-income coun-
ries whereas the second is likely to dominate in emerging
arkets.10 In the case of financial openness we have a simi-
ar trade-off. On the one hand, financial repression may foster
emand for domestic debt by creating a captive investor base
for a description of financial repression in a large sample of
ountries over a period of more than 100 years, see Reinhart
nd Sbrancia, 2011). On the other hand, such a policy prevents
he participation of foreign investors in the domestic market. It
s thus possible that financial repressions has a negative effect
n the development of the domestic debt market in countriesebt issued domestically but sold to foreign investors should be classified as
xternal debt. However, few countries do this and usually they classify all debt
ssued on the domestic market as domestic debt (see Panizza, 2008; Cowan et al.,
005).
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Table 4
Random effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL developing count. Low-income Middle-income
Ln(INF)t−1 0.261 −0.492 −0.953 −2.441 0.545 −0.326
(0.44) (0.86) (0.67) (0.85) (0.68) (0.64)
CA/GDPt−1 2.299 13.788 1.187 58.849 9.586 19.712
(0.45) (0.95) (0.12) (1.05) (0.69) (1.18)
BANKCRISt−1 −0.265 −0.235 −9.210 −6.205 0.322 0.399
(0.16) (0.17) (2.75)*** (0.72) (0.16) (0.25)
DEFAULTt−1 −0.595 0.462 −0.274 −0.166 −1.168 0.246
(0.29) (0.23) (0.07) (0.03) (0.46) (0.10)
M2/GDPt−1 6.918 4.797 77.762 95.388 1.860 4.444
(1.05) (0.91) (3.39)*** (2.26)** (0.29) (0.85)
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.042 0.040 0.210 −1.455 0.046 0.045
(3.90)*** (3.50)*** (1.41) (0.90) (5.14)*** (4.49)***
Ln(GDP PC)t−1 8.155 14.119 12.311 9.792 5.438 18.925
(1.61) (2.28)** (2.12)** (1.44) (0.72) (2.43)**
DEBT/GDPt−1 6.939 19.907 −0.685 −40.939 14.356 22.734
(2.07)** (4.18)*** (0.08) (1.00) (2.67)*** (3.53)***
(DEBT/GDP)2t−1 −1.061 −3.485 0.110 15.179 −2.843 −3.898
(2.25)** (3.13)*** (0.08) (1.26) (2.53)** (2.79)***
DRER −9.768 −6.312 −19.036 −21.668 −11.345 −6.187
(3.12)*** (1.37) (2.38)** (1.32) (2.34)** (1.20)
OPENt−1 −0.026 −0.003 −0.213 −0.272 0.006 −0.002
(0.50) (0.04) (2.93)*** (2.32)** (0.09) (0.03)
CORR 8.704 6.509 −6.463 −21.255 11.779 3.995
(1.60) (0.99) (1.02) (0.99) (1.80)* (0.56)
DEBTCONTR −1.224 −1.564 9.257 10.501 −1.878 −2.652
(0.67) (0.80) (1.59) (1.12) (1.03) (1.42)
DEBTEXPL 4.692 5.715 4.103 4.332 4.191 4.015
(3.70)*** (4.02)*** (0.88) (0.41) (2.83)*** (2.80)***
FIXt−1 −1.403 5.820 −1.906
(0.91) (0.55) (1.14)
INTt−1 −1.656 3.312 −1.669
(1.20) (0.64) (1.10)
CAPCONt−1 0.677 −1.333 0.958
(1.93)* (1.07) (2.89)***
GBAL/GDPt−1 −0.240 −0.500 −0.056
(1.00) (0.52) (0.22)
TOTt−1 −0.023 0.379 −0.042
(0.41) (1.95)* (0.55)
RER MISt−1 −7.550 4.299 −5.772
(1.88)* (0.16) (1.70)*
ECA −6.779 −14.695 10.776 30.853 −17.454 −22.692
(0.80) (1.54) (1.82)* (2.30)** (1.65)* (2.46)**
LAC −14.804 −24.789 −15.960 6.467 −25.699 −31.842
(1.96)* (2.64)*** (1.60) (0.24) (2.90)*** (3.95)***
SAS 6.068 6.789 −7.767 69.313 −1.042 1.724
(0.80) (0.72) (1.00) (1.00) (0.11) (0.20)
SSA −3.247 −5.861 8.085 26.498 −14.435 −13.692
(0.39) (0.54) (1.43) (1.23) (1.12) (1.14)
MNA −5.544 −19.175 0.000 0.000 −15.812 −24.929
(0.52) (1.70)* (.) (.) (1.49) (2.62)***
Constant −36.257 −77.923 −81.036 −77.213 −9.020 −116.733
(0.91) (1.39) (1.73)* (1.33) (0.15) (1.67)*
Observations 1107 733 324 152 783 581
N. of countries 95 74 33 22 62 52
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses (standard errors are clustered at the country level).
* Statistically significant at 10%.
** Statistically significant at 5%.
*** Statistically significant at 1%.
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tively correlated with the domestic debt share, indicating that an
improvement in the terms of trade reduce the needs of external
borrowing.1314 K. Forslund et al. / Review of De
. Results
We start by describing the results of a random effects model
hich can jointly capture cross-country and within country
eterminants of debt composition and then discuss what hap-
ens when we move to a fixed effects model. For each group of
ountries and estimation technique, we estimate the model using
he full set of controls but also use a subset of controls which
llows for a larger sample of countries.
.1. Random effects estimations
As expected, we find that in most regressions inflation has a
egative coefficient, indicating that lack of monetary credibility
s an obstacle to developing the market for domestic public debt
the exceptions are columns 1 and 5 of Table 4). However, we
nd that the coefficients are never statistically significant. This is
urprising because one common finding of the existing literature
s the presence of a strong and negative correlation between past
nflation and the development of the domestic bond market.11
n the next subsection we will investigate in greater detail why
e do not find a statistically significant relationship between
nflation and domestic debt share.
As expected, the current account balance has always a pos-
tive coefficient, indicating that countries that are running a
urrent account surplus do not need to borrow abroad. However,
s in the case of inflation, the coefficient is never statistically sig-
ificant. We also find that the government balance has a negative
oefficient. This is consistent with our hypothesis that devel-
ping countries tend to issue more domestic debt – relative to
xternal debt – when they have budgetary problems. But, again,
he coefficient is not statistically significant.
The relationship between domestic debt share and total pub-
ic debt is non-linear and concave in the full sample and in the
ub sample of middle-income countries, but convex and not sta-
istically significant in the sub sample of low-income countries.
concave relationship between total public debt and domestic
ebt share is consistent with the hypothesis that, at lower levels of
ublic debt, increases in the stock of debt have a positive impact
ver the share of domestic debt due to its role in developing the
ebt market. However, higher levels of debt may lead to sustain-
bility problems and increase the incentives to inflate away the
ebt and thus reduce the demand for domestically issued debt.
t is worth noting that our point estimate suggests that the rela-
ionship between domestic debt share and total public debt only
ecomes negative when total public debt reaches 300 per cent of
DP (in column 1 of Table 4, the level of debt that maximizes
he domestic debt share is 6.9/(2 × 1.061) = 3.27.
The variable measuring the misalignment of the real
xchange rate has a negative and statistically significant coef-
cient (except in low-income countries). Thus, we find that
he share of domestic debt decreases when the real exchange
ate is above its long-run trend. This fact is consistent with the
11 See Burger and Warnock (2006) and the other papers mentioned in the
ntroduction.
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resence of long-term currency misalignments which, in turn,
ay be sustained by speculative activities such as carry trade.
Focusing on the second group of variables, we find the
xpected results that country size and the level of development
re positively correlated with domestic debt share. However, the
oefficients are not always statistically significant. In particu-
ar, we find that, on average, larger countries (as measured by
otal GDP) tend to have larger domestic debt shares, but this
esult does not hold for low-income countries. GDP per capita
as a positive impact over domestic debt share and its coeffi-
ient is statistically (or close to being statistically significant) in
ost regressions. Our proxy for financial development, M2 over
DP, is positive in all cases but only significant in low-income
ountries.12 In most cases, institutional quality (measured as
ack of corruption) has a positive impact on domestic debt share
ut the coefficients are rarely statistically significant.
The group of variables aimed at capturing crises and exter-
al shocks also give mixed results. The sovereign default and
anking crisis dummies are rarely significant and switch sign
cross samples. However, we do find the expected result that
ow-income countries tend to finance banking crises by issu-
ng external debt and middle-income countries finance banking
rises by issuing more domestic debt. In the latter case, how-
ver, the coefficients are not even close to being statistically
ignificant. With respect to the sovereign default dummy, we
nd that the coefficient is never statistically significant, a fact
hat is probably driven by reverse causality. As expected, we find
hat currency depreciations have a negative effect on domestic
ebt share, indicating the presence of balance sheet effects. The
ffect is not significant in columns 2, 4, or 6. This may be due to
he fact that in these columns we also control for exchange rate
isalignments, a variable which is positively correlated with the
hange in the real exchange rate (DRER).
The dummy variable capturing sudden debt contractions is
egative and not statistically significant in the whole sample
nd in the sub sample of middle-income countries but is pos-
tive (and close to being statistically significant in column 3)
n the sub sample of low-income countries. The results for low-
ncome countries confirm our prior that sudden debt contractions
re driven by debt relief episodes, the results for middle-income
ountries are instead puzzling. The dummy variable associ-
ted with debt explosion is positive and often significant (the
xception is the sub sample of low-income countries where
he coefficients are not statistically significant). This indicates
hat, once valuation effects are controlled for, debt explosions
re mostly driven by skeletons which are financed by issuing
omestic debt. As expected, terms of trade shocks are posi-12 This is in contrast with the results of Borensztein et al. (2008) who find a
lose correlation between the development of the banking system and that of the
omestic bond market.
13 Moreover, if countries are trying to stabilize their exchange rate, a positive
erm of trade shock and the associated current account surplus often translates
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In Table 6, we use STATA’s robust regression estimator to
check whether or results are driven by outliers.16 The main dif-
ferences with respect to the estimations of Table 5 concern the
14 The coefficients of the regional dummies in column 2 of Table 4 are even
larger, indicating that including more controls does not change the situation.Fig. 3. Raw and adjusted domestic debt shares.
The effects of the two measures of openness differ across
ountry groups. In low-income countries, both trade openness
nd capital account openness have a negative effect on domestic
ebt share (but only trade openness is statistically significant).
n middle-income countries, instead, both openness variables
re positively correlated with domestic debt share (although the
oefficient of trade openness is almost zero and not even close
o being statistically significant). These differential effects are
onsistent with the fact that in middle-income countries open-
ess favors the entry of foreign investors, which is not the case
n low-income countries. We find that the exchange rate regime
as no statistically significant effect on domestic debt share.
We can use the regional dummies to decompose regional dif-
erences in the share of domestic debt into a part that can be
xplained by our set of independent variables and an unexplained
art. The results of this decomposition are somewhat surpris-
ng as they indicate that country characteristics do a very poor
ob at explaining regional differences in domestic debt shares.
n particular, we can use Table 4 to simulate what would hap-
en to domestic debt share if each region had the same average
ountry characteristics of the East Asia and Pacific region (we
hoose this region as a benchmark because it is the region that
as made the biggest effort to develop the domestic bond mar-
et, see Eichengreen et al., 2006). We do this in Fig. 3. The
ark bars report the “raw” share of domestic debt (from Panel B
f Table 3) and the light bars represent the simulated share (by
onstruction the two bars have equal height in the EAP region).
he only region in which country characteristics explain a sub-
tantial share of the regional difference is Sub Saharan Africa.
n this case, the point estimates suggest that if countries in Sub
aharan Africa had the same characteristics as countries in East
sia, their share of domestic debt would increase by 4 percent-
ge points, reducing the difference with East Asia by almost 50
er cent. In all other cases, assuming the characteristics of the
verage East Asian country would lead to an increase in the dif-
erence between each region’s share of domestic debt and the
hare of domestic debt in East Asia. The most striking examples
nto a net accumulation of international reserves and the need to issue domestic
ecurities in order to sterilize the liquidity created through reserve accumulation.
c
c
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re Europe & Central Asia and Latin America & the Caribbean.
urope & Central Asia has a share of domestic debt which is
lightly larger than that of East Asia & Pacific (38.9 per cent
ersus 37.3 per cent). However, if we were to assign to Europe
Central Asian countries the characteristics of the average East
sia & Pacific country, the share of domestic debt in Europe &
entral Asia would drop by 8.5 percentage points and, at 30
er cent, would become much lower than that of East Asia. In
he case of Latin America & the Caribbean, the raw differential
s almost 10 percentage points (37.3 per cent versus 27.8 per
ent), but the simulated differential is close to 15 percentage
oints (37.3 per cent versus 22.5 per cent). This suggests that
ountry characteristics (or at least, the ones that we are able to
apture in our econometric model) do not seem to play a role
n explaining the fact that governments in Latin America & the
aribbean borrow abroad much more than governments in East
sia & the Pacific.14
.2. Fixed effects estimations
Table 5 estimates a set of specifications similar to those
f Table 4 by using a fixed effects model. While the random
ffects estimations can be interpreted as jointly capturing cross-
ountry and within-country differences, fixed effects estimations
ocus on within-country differences and, at the cost of a higher
oise to signal ratio, allow to fully control for all time-invariant
ountry-specific factors. Thus fixed effects estimates should be
nterpreted as an indication of whether within-country changes
n country characteristics are associated with within-country
hanges in domestic debt share.15 We find that the two estima-
ion techniques yield similar results. The main difference is that
e now find a much stronger effect of total GDP (statistically
ignificant in 5 regressions and close to being significant in the
ixth), indicating that GDP growth is positively associated with
ncreases in domestic debt share (as we measure GDP in nominal
S dollars, this may be due to valuation effects). We find that
he effect of debt level is statistically significant and concave
n all subsamples. In the case of low-income countries there
re statistically significant domestic market-promoting effects
f capital controls and budget deficits. Finally, we now find
o significant relationship between trade openness and share
f domestic debt. As before, we find that there is no statistically
ignificant relationship between inflation and domestic debt
hare.15 In the fixed effect estimates we do not control for corruption and GDP per
apita. The first exclusion is due to the fact that we do not have annual data for
orruption, the second exclusion is due to the fact that within country changes of
DP per capita are highly correlated with within country changes in total GDP.
16 In particular, we use rreg in STATA. This command estimates a robust regres-
ion using iteratively reweighed least squares. Extreme outliers with Cook’s D
reater than 1 are assigned a weight of zero.
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Table 5
Fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL developing count. Low-income Middle-income
Ln(INF)t−1 0.166 −0.589 −0.610 −0.747 0.440 −0.483
(0.38) (1.41) (1.25) (0.70) (0.71) (1.08)
CA/GDPt−1 2.683 8.675 −0.787 23.634 9.705 14.045
(0.73) (0.84) (0.22) (0.82) (1.17) (1.19)
BANKCRISt−1 −0.438 −0.372 −2.325 −7.147 −0.044 0.238
(0.42) (0.30) (1.57) (2.02)** (0.03) (0.17)
DEFAULTt−1 −0.632 0.072 −0.828 −0.339 −0.898 0.388
(0.53) (0.06) (0.31) (0.10) (0.65) (0.29)
M2/GDPt−1 8.143 7.014 18.367 −12.613 3.919 8.602
(2.09)** (1.61) (1.77)* (0.58) (0.93) (1.95)*
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.040 0.040 1.150 0.849 0.043 0.047
(4.85)*** (4.86)*** (5.26)*** (1.43) (4.80)*** (5.44)***
DEBT/GDPt−1 5.527 18.129 7.738 44.977 12.227 20.107
(2.98)*** (6.05)*** (3.00)*** (3.52)*** (3.58)*** (5.10)***
(DEBT/GDP)2t−1 −0.846 −3.087 −1.092 −12.781 −2.326 −3.212
(2.79)*** (4.57)*** (3.09)*** (3.45)*** (3.43)*** (4.18)***
DRER −9.637 −6.499 −9.524 8.188 −11.395 −7.169
(3.27)*** (1.51) (2.42)** (1.09) (2.80)*** (1.47)
OPENt−1 0.003 0.048 −0.019 −0.095 0.031 0.053
(0.10) (1.18) (0.48) (1.15) (0.82) (1.20)
DEBTCONTR −0.883 −1.373 2.650 10.681 −1.411 −2.449
(0.51) (0.71) (0.57) (1.92)* (0.77) (1.28)
DEBTEXPL 4.737 5.787 6.259 16.037 4.170 4.260
(3.64)*** (3.81)*** (2.63)*** (4.53)*** (2.77)*** (2.67)***
FIXt−1 −0.833 −3.818 −0.681
(0.69) (1.29) (0.51)
INTt−1 −1.700 −2.583 −1.615
(1.95)* (1.08) (1.73)*
CAPCONt−1 0.786 −1.755 1.073
(2.90)*** (2.58)** (3.91)***
GBAL/GDPt−1 −0.187 −0.895 0.089
(1.09) (2.10)** (0.51)
TOTt−1 −0.003 −0.089 −0.004
(0.08) (1.71) (0.09)
RER MISt−1 −6.953 −32.437 −4.700
(2.28)** (3.52)*** (1.68)*
Constant 29.821 12.914 5.697 29.065 14.698 13.429
(7.82)*** (2.06)** (1.28) (1.97)* (2.92)*** (1.67)*
Observations 1122 734 324 152 798 582
N. of countries 97 74 33 22 64 52
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%.
*
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** Statistically significant at 1%.
nflation, banking crisis, and openness variables. As before, we
nd that inflation is rarely statistically significant (except for col-
mn 4), but we now find that in half of the cases the coefficient is
ositive, which is the opposite of what we expected. In the case
f banking crises, we now find a negative and statistically sig-
ificant coefficient in middle-income countries, indicating that
ountries with market access try to borrow abroad in order to
nance the resolution of a banking crisis. This is the opposite of
hat we found in our random effects estimations. With respect
o trade openness, we now find a positive coefficient in column 4
nd a negative coefficient in column 3. We checked whether this
ifference in results is driven by the additional controls or by
he smaller sample of column 4 and find that the result is driven
t
h
i
sy the smaller sample and not by the presence of additional
ontrols.
.3. Probing further
The results discussed above are surprising as they indicate
hat most of our independent variables have limited ability to
xplain cross-country and within-country differences in domes-
ic debt share. However, the most puzzling finding is that we
ave not been able to identify a robust and statistically signif-
cant link between inflation and domestic debt share. In this
ection we explore possible reasons for this puzzling result.
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Table 6
Fixed effects. Robust regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL developing count. Low-income Middle-income
Ln(INF)t−1 0.006 −0.012 0.305 1.238 −0.302 −0.252
(0.02) (0.03) (1.15) (2.32)** (0.76) (0.53)
CA/GDPt−1 1.112 6.929 −2.811 −23.515 2.913 8.874
(0.33) (0.88) (1.24) (1.92)* (0.41) (0.96)
BANKCRISt−1 −2.383 −1.733 −0.993 1.248 −2.616 −2.289
(2.76)*** (1.61) (1.04) (0.61) (2.37)** (1.86)*
DEFAULTt−1 0.543 −0.907 −3.348 −1.442 0.373 −0.948
(0.56) (0.81) (3.10)*** (0.92) (0.30) (0.72)
M2/GDPt−1 11.244 5.323 9.081 6.099 8.339 6.715
(3.73)*** (1.46) (1.76)* (0.53) (2.36)** (1.72)*
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.046 0.043 0.808 0.921 0.048 0.052
(6.17)*** (5.53)*** (6.55)*** (2.35)** (5.68)*** (6.14)***
DEBT/GDPt−1 3.289 14.069 3.378 11.034 12.116 19.683
(1.96)* (4.86)*** (2.68)*** (1.73)* (3.75)*** (5.46)***
(DEBT/GDP)2t−1 −0.565 −2.777 −0.466 −4.454 −2.228 −3.301
(1.86)* (3.34)*** (2.19)** (2.21)** (2.44)** (3.52)***
DRER −4.311 −4.160 −0.902 3.417 −7.195 −8.496
(1.70)* (1.22) (0.42) (0.71) (1.97)** (2.03)**
OPENt−1 0.001 0.066 −0.042 0.090 0.005 0.038
(0.04) (2.46)** (2.43)** (2.30)** (0.17) (1.18)
DEBTCONTR −2.296 −2.532 3.554 −2.540 −2.103 −3.225
(2.06)** (2.00)** (2.06)** (0.79) (1.61) (2.35)**
DEBTEXPL 3.693 4.872 1.683 7.127 3.857 3.480
(3.63)*** (4.15)*** (1.58) (3.69)*** (2.94)*** (2.59)***
FIXt−1 −0.949 2.072 −0.786
(0.94) (1.34) (0.65)
INTt−1 −1.221 0.216 −1.027
(1.62) (0.17) (1.23)
CAPCONt−1 0.515 −0.842 0.682
(2.58)** (1.97)* (3.12)***
GBAL/GDPt−1 −0.055 −0.025 0.014
(0.45) (0.15) (0.09)
TOTt−1 0.011 −0.012 0.038
(0.37) (0.36) (0.99)
RER MISt−1 −4.336 −9.505 −2.396
(2.41)** (1.96)* (1.21)
Constant −29.819 −20.462 −5.848 −32.662 −17.823 −32.098
(3.12)*** (2.94)*** (0.94) (1.47) (1.52) (3.04)***
Observations 1122 733 324 152 798 581
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%.
**
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** Statistically significant at 1%.
One possible explanation for this finding is reverse causality
governments that put little weight on the cost of inflation may
ant to issue more domestic debt because this debt is easier
o dilute with inflation). While we cannot directly test for this
ypothesis because we do not have a good instrument for infla-
ion, we suspect that the standard effect (i.e., limited demand
or domestic debt instruments in presence of a history of high
nflation) should dominate any effect that may drive a positive
orrelation between inflation and domestic debt share. In fact, all
he papers surveyed in the introduction find that inflation has a
egative effect on the development of the domestic bond market.
Another possibility is multicollinearity. By including up to
8 controls in our model we may have been too ambitious in
t
w
brying to separate different effects of macro stability. Inflation
s correlated with several explanatory variables in our list and
ur regressions may not be powerful enough to capture the indi-
idual effects all of these variables. In Table 7, we address this
ssue by using a more parsimonious set of controls and we still
nd the same results of inflation being positively (albeit, not
ignificantly) correlated with domestic debt share and, again,
e find that the only variables which are robustly correlated
ith domestic debt share are country size, level of debt, and
urrency depreciations. Another possibility is that inflation cap-
ures differences in domestic debt share across regions but not
ithin regions. To check this hypothesis, we re-estimated Table 4
y dropping the regional dummies. Our basic results remain
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Table 7
Panel regressions with reduced set of controls.
Random effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (1) (2)
All developing count. Middle-income All developing count. Middle-income
Ln(INF)t−1 0.271 0.509 0.172 0.394
(0.47) (0.65) (0.40) (0.67)
CA/GDPt−1 3.097 7.668 2.552 8.248
(0.73) (0.64) (0.82) (1.14)
M2/GDPt−1 6.360 3.795 7.087 5.083
(0.98) (0.54) (1.89)* (1.23)
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.043 0.046 0.041 0.045
(4.43)*** (5.20)*** (5.16)*** (5.22)***
Ln(GDP PC)t−1 9.882 8.032
(2.36)** (1.09)
DEBT/GDPt−1 6.268 12.677 4.555 11.062
(1.93)* (2.42)** (2.55)** (3.50)***
(DEBT/GDP)2t−1 −0.963 −2.453 −0.697 −1.999
(2.08)** (2.25)** (2.49)** (3.31)***
DRER −5.155 −8.491 −6.059 −9.489
(2.36)** (1.98)** (2.78)*** (2.52)**
ECA −2.223 −8.730
(0.26) (0.71)
LAC −10.113 −17.629
(1.33) (1.66)*
SAS 9.861 5.125
(1.29) (0.45)
SSA 0.637 −4.173
(0.07) (0.28)
MNA 1.388 −6.292
(0.13) (0.52)
Constant −51.699 −30.091 30.795 32.375
(1.45) (0.46) (10.94)*** (9.36)***
Observations 1130 796 1139 805
N. of countries 96 63 97 64
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%.
** Statistically significant at 5%.
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ital controls (we define all country-year with an index below 3
as having high capital controls; where 3 is the 33rd percentile
of the capital control index) and then interact this variable with
inflation.17 Formally, we estimate the following model:** Statistically significant at 1%.
nchanged. We also found the same when we estimated the
odel by dropping year fixed effects.
Another possibility is that by using annual data we are unable
o capture the medium or long-term relationship between mon-
tary credibility and domestic debt share. To address this issue,
e re-estimate our panel regression using three-year averages
nstead of annual data but we still find that there is no statisti-
ally significant relationship between domestic debt share and
nflation (Table 8). Next, we move to purely cross-sectional data
nd we find a negative and statistically significant relationship
etween inflation and domestic debt share when we compute
verages for the 1990–2005 period, but we do not find any sig-
ificant relationship between these variables when we examine
ny other sub period (Table 9).
Summing up, we find a significant relationship between infla-
ion and domestic debt share only when we use cross-sectional
ata and averages over a 15 year period. Even in this case, we
btained the result only by dropping two outliers, if these two
utliers are not excluded, the relationship between inflation and comestic debt share remains insignificant even in the 1990–2005
ample.
In the previous section, we mentioned that in presence
f financial repression, the government could force domestic
nvestors to buy government paper even if this yields a low real
eturn. If this were the case, we should find a positive relationship
etween inflation and domestic debt share in countries with high
evels of capital controls and a negative relationship between
nflation and domestic debt share in countries with low levels of
apital controls. We can test this hypothesis by substituting our
ontinuous measure of capital controls with a discrete measure
hat takes the value of one in countries with high level of cap-17 We could have done the same using the continuous measure of capital
ontrols but there results would have been more difficult to interpret.
K. Forslund et al. / Review of Development Finance 1 (2011) 207–222 219
Table 8
Panel estimations, 3-year averages.
Random effects Fixed effects Fixed effects, robust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Developing Countries
Ln(INF)t−1 1.043 −0.768 0.924 −0.601 −0.335 −0.843
(0.95) (0.67) (0.91) (0.55) (0.55) (0.99)
CA/GDPt−1 14.321 42.443 17.145 35.464 10.500 9.967
(1.27) (1.61) (1.74)* (1.40) (1.41) (0.63)
BANKCRISt−1 −1.435 −1.513 −1.555 −1.501 −1.846 0.607
(0.82) (0.91) (0.88) (0.74) (1.32) (0.36)
DEFAULTt−1 0.512 1.537 0.611 1.543 1.021 −0.692
(0.24) (0.75) (0.32) (0.84) (0.68) (0.43)
M2/GDPt−1 4.654 5.150 4.255 3.887 11.535 4.751
(0.64) (0.82) (0.54) (0.54) (2.11)** (0.76)
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.058 0.049 0.062 0.052 0.056 0.050
(4.44)*** (3.75)*** (3.40)*** (3.11)*** (3.85)*** (3.22)***
Ln(GDP PC)t−1 10.298 12.530
(2.03)** (1.97)**
DEBT/GDPt−1 8.516 18.575 8.216 20.954 7.756 19.184
(1.85)* (3.31)*** (1.81)* (3.93)*** (2.04)** (3.64)***
(DEBT/GDP)2t−1 −1.737 −2.663 −1.636 −2.908 −1.411 −3.634
(1.80)* (2.13)** (1.64) (2.22)** (1.50) (2.29)**
DRER −11.123 −2.686 −9.977 −1.294 0.471 2.278
(1.88)* (0.39) (1.46) (0.18) (0.08) (0.31)
OPENt−1 0.013 −0.038 0.080 0.052 0.022 0.134
(0.24) (0.61) (1.54) (0.72) (0.69) (2.85)***
CORR 6.760 8.616
(1.21) (1.20)
DEBTCONTR −1.225 −3.419 −0.334 −2.968 0.691 −0.797
(0.55) (1.55) (0.15) (1.33) (0.49) (0.51)
DEBTEXPL 3.682 1.833 4.018 2.023 3.831 3.311
(2.49)** (1.14) (2.70)*** (1.16) (3.25)*** (2.42)**
FIXt−1 −2.954 −1.750 −2.518
(0.92) (0.59) (1.12)
INTt−1 −2.815 −2.674 −2.003
(0.95) (1.10) (1.15)
CAPCONt−1 0.921 −0.079 0.062
(1.72)* (0.23) (0.25)
GBAL/GDPt−1 −0.261 1.278 1.338
(0.75) (2.39)** (3.76)***
TOTt−1 −0.006 −7.785 −6.522
(0.09) (1.94)* (2.05)**
RER MISt−1 −8.359 0.011 0.054
(2.05)** (0.17) (1.16)
ECA −6.763 −11.870
(0.77) (1.10)
LAC −14.218 −25.250
(1.83)* (2.41)**
SAS 9.492 6.063
(1.28) (0.63)
SSA −0.461 −4.774
(0.06) (0.44)
MNA −2.785 −20.685
(0.28) (1.76)*
Constant −58.996 −64.960 10.238 9.354 −5.609 −25.306
(1.46) (1.14) (1.79)* (0.98) (0.98) (1.35)
Observations 399 280 406 280 406 280
N. of countries 95 73 97 73 97 73
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%.
*** Statistically significant at 5%.
** Statistically significant at 1%.
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Table 9
Cross country regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1990–2006 1990–95 1996–01 2002–06 1990–2006 1990–95 1996–01 2002–06
Ln(INF) −1.968 −7.191 3.672 −4.165 −4.725 −1.367 −5.843 1.498 −3.359 −5.399
(0.67) (2.18)** (0.99) (1.16) (1.11) (0.55) (2.01)** (0.48) (0.95) (1.35)
CA/GDP 3.504 22.478 139.594 50.531 78.074 21.223 24.647 115.414 63.161 84.738
(0.10) (0.46) (1.72)* (0.98) (1.42) (0.63) (0.52) (1.50) (1.21) (1.81)*
DEFAULT 1.491 −3.356 7.406 −5.851 −6.779 −3.052 −4.606 1.125 −4.397 −6.333
(0.30) (0.63) (0.83) (0.95) (0.86) (0.67) (0.92) (0.15) (0.67) (0.81)
M2/GDPt 20.154 15.697 27.098 22.143 2.588 14.934 6.034 39.154 6.658 −2.423
(2.84)*** (1.94)* (1.19) (2.34)** (0.38) (2.35)** (0.82) (1.81)* (0.76) (0.40)
Ln(GDP)t 0.028 0.033 0.070 0.027 0.016 0.034 0.038 0.102 0.040 0.022
(1.70)* (1.91)* (1.28) (1.27) (1.26) (2.14)** (2.34)** (1.86)* (1.99)* (1.91)*
Ln(GDP PC) 11.980 16.701 17.460 12.288 14.726 7.334 8.685 10.652 2.620 7.255
(2.54)** (2.95)*** (1.78)* (1.93)* (2.21)** (1.73)* (1.68)* (1.30) (0.45) (1.33)
DEBT/GDP 3.548 −2.919 −16.419 −4.916 6.452 7.215 2.001 −19.658 −4.084 9.312
(0.28) (0.21) (0.95) (0.25) (0.28) (0.60) (0.15) (1.24) (0.20) (0.40)
(DEBT/GDP)2 −0.888 0.182 2.720 2.025 −2.761 −2.447 −1.730 2.825 1.672 −3.752
(0.25) (0.05) (0.96) (0.27) (0.26) (0.71) (0.46) (1.03) (0.21) (0.35)
OPEN −0.120 −0.090 0.093 −0.063 −0.103 −0.075 −0.025 0.096 0.009 −0.053
(1.67)* (1.13) (0.67) (0.73) (1.23) (1.11) (0.33) (0.75) (0.11) (0.75)
CORR 3.041 −2.747 −8.557 1.234 3.382 3.919 2.179 −7.773 5.975 8.459
(0.59) (0.45) (1.02) (0.17) (0.44) (0.78) (0.37) (0.96) (0.84) (1.28)
FIX −17.768 −3.213 −10.906 −11.037 −11.244 1.186 −8.716 −10.62
(2.16)** (0.29) (1.25) (1.43) (1.43) (0.11) (1.05) (1.49)
INT 2.998 −14.364 2.519 −5.777 −0.417 −10.712 0.722 −8.060
(0.24) (0.99) (0.22) (0.59) (0.03) (0.74) (0.06) (0.88)
CAPCON 0.446 −2.045 0.720 0.116 −0.535 −2.459 −0.244 −0.600
(0.50) (1.28) (0.79) (0.12) (0.66) (1.74)* (0.29) (0.71)
GBAL/GDP −2.739 −2.345 −3.024 −2.454 −2.284 −2.204 −1.944 −2.029
(2.88)*** (2.03)* (2.57)** (2.21)** (2.44)** (2.07)** (1.73)* (1.88)*
ECA 0.397 −3.177 −32.436 −5.763 −10.922
(0.05) (0.29) (2.02)* (0.49) (0.92)
LAC −13.973 −13.179 −32.664 −15.780 −15.202
(1.70)* (1.23) (2.40)** (1.39) (1.27)
SAS 5.557 −5.814 −10.246 1.860 −5.131
(0.47) (0.42) (0.60) (0.10) (0.32)
SSA 2.722 11.521 −24.030 9.095 3.079
(0.36) (1.08) (1.65) (0.76) (0.25)
MNA −12.599 −19.172 −28.401 −41.357 −22.931
(1.22) (1.62) (1.86)* (2.55)** (1.54)
CONST −58.734 −84.046 −104.43 −60.227 −61.453 −25.721 −21.761 −71.003 19.301 −2.105
(1.41) (1.74)* (1.32) (1.11) (1.02) (0.69) (0.50) (1.10) (0.39) (0.04)
Observations 102 84 48 77 78 102 84 48 77 78
R-squared 0.38 0.50 0.58 0.45 0.46 0.31 0.41 0.47 0.31 0.40
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%.
*
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Dt,i = αLINFt−1,i + βHCCt−1,i + γ(LINFt−1,i
×HCCt−1,i) + λXt−1,i + νi + εt,i
here DD is domestic debt share, LINF is log inflation, HCC
s a dummy that takes value one in case of high capital con-
rols, X is a matrix of other controls, ν is a set of random or
xed effects, and ε is the error term. Within this setup, β mea-
ures the relationship between inflation and domestic debt share
n countries that do not have a high level of capital controls,
+ γ measures the relationship between inflation and domestic
ebt share in countries that have a high level of capital con-
rols, and γ measures the difference between the relationship
b
t
ietween inflation and domestic debt share in countries that have
high level of capital controls and the relationship between
nflation and domestic debt share in countries that do not have
high level of capital controls. If our hypothesis is correct, we
hould find that β is negative and statistically significant and γ
s positive and, possibly, statistically significant. Indeed, this is
hat we find in Table 10. The coefficient attached to inflation
s always negative and is statistically significant in 5 out of 6
egressions (with a p-value of 0.106, the coefficient is close to
eing statistically significant in the 6th regression). As expected,
he coefficients attached to the interaction term are always pos-
tive. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant in one
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Table 10
Interactions between capital controls and inflation.
Random effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All developing countries Middle-income Low-income All developing count. Middle-income Low-income
Ln(INF)t−1 −1.279 −1.117 −5.744 −1.325 −1.227 −3.994
(2.07)** (1.65)* (1.61) (2.15)** (1.86)* (2.26)**
Ln(INF)t−1 × HCAPCONt−1 0.994 0.738 5.412 1.005 0.850 4.967
(1.43) (0.90) (1.45) (1.50) (1.11) (2.81)***
CA/GDPt−1 9.863 11.211 79.045 7.197 11.795 15.261
(0.98) (0.96) (3.29)*** (0.68) (0.96) (0.52)
BANKCRISt−1 −0.768 −0.130 −4.236 −0.850 −0.077 −2.229
(0.64) (0.10) (0.61) (0.69) (0.06) (0.68)
DEFAULTt−1 0.037 −0.384 −0.905 0.092 0.305 −0.196
(0.03) (0.26) (0.25) (0.07) (0.23) (0.06)
M2/GDPt−1 8.496 6.966 38.238 6.699 8.239 −23.051
(1.98)** (1.52) (1.71)* (1.54) (1.87)* (1.08)
Ln(GDP)t−1 0.044 0.048 −0.161 0.039 0.046 0.949
(7.24)*** (7.68)*** (0.52) (4.94)*** (5.35)*** (1.54)
FIXt−1 −0.940 −1.469 2.438 −0.539 −0.340 −3.299
(0.73) (0.93) (0.51) (0.44) (0.25) (1.14)
INTt−1 −1.479 −1.426 −2.484 −1.430 −1.244 −3.041
(1.66)* (1.44) (0.58) (1.60) (1.29) (1.22)
GBAL/GDPt−1 −0.267 −0.121 −0.709 −0.234 0.013 −0.813
(1.57) (0.64) (1.31) (1.33) (0.07) (1.97)*
DEBT/GDPt−1 12.871 14.395 −48.880 15.867 18.034 35.893
(4.10)*** (3.53)*** (2.29)** (5.19)*** (4.54)*** (2.84)***
(DEBT/GDP)2t−1 −2.331 −2.788 18.351 −2.805 −2.967 −9.246
(3.37)*** (3.24)*** (2.57)** (3.95)*** (3.79)*** (2.39)**
DRER −8.305 −8.211 −35.991 −7.046 −7.854 3.514
(2.00)** (1.67)* (2.40)** (1.63) (1.57) (0.47)
HCAPCONt−1 −2.717 −3.277 −7.809 −2.754 −3.764 1.535
(1.33) (1.36) (0.93) (1.36) (1.54) (0.51)
RER MISt−1 −5.720 −4.048 27.058 −6.506 −4.358 −25.551
(1.99)** (1.50) (1.61) (2.08)** (1.48) (3.06)***
TOTt−1 −0.016 −0.017 0.309 −0.005 −0.002 −0.069
(0.44) (0.35) (2.94)*** (0.14) (0.04) (1.41)
OPENt−1 0.029 0.044 −0.196 0.044 0.043 −0.089
(0.83) (1.23) (2.99)*** (1.08) (0.95) (1.13)
DEBTCONTR −1.059 −2.205 14.407 −0.875 −1.804 10.016
(0.57) (1.15) (2.33)** (0.46) (0.95) (1.79)*
DEBTEXPL 5.543 4.190 4.447 5.688 4.283 14.361
(3.64)*** (2.40)** (0.49) (3.66)*** (2.60)*** (3.99)***
Constant 19.112 22.959 26.412 18.203 20.428 7.935
(2.90)*** (2.80)*** (1.64) (2.97)*** (2.56)** (0.66)
Observations 734 582 152 734 582 152
N. of countries 74 52 22 74 52 22
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.57
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%.
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** Statistically significant at 1%.
egression (column 6) and close to being statistically significant
n other three regressions (where the p-values of columns 1, 3,
nd 4 are 0.15, 0.14, and 0.13). The sum of the main and inter-
cted effects (β + γ) ranges between −0.29 and 0.98, but this
um of coefficients in never statistically significant, indicating
hat there is no significant relationship between inflation and
omestic debt share in countries with high capital controls. This
vidence is consistent with the idea that our finding of no strong
egative correlation between inflation and domestic debt share
an be explained with the presence of capital controls and that
l
a
dnflation has a negative impact on the share of domestic debt in
ountries with low capital controls and no impact in countries
ith high capital controls.
. ConclusionsIn this paper we use a new dataset on the composition of pub-
ic debt in developing and emerging market countries to look
t the correlation between country characteristics and domestic
ebt share. We start by showing that there are large regional
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ifferences in the composition of public debt and then we check
hether our regressions could help us in understanding the deter-
inants of these differences. Even though we tried to control
or a large set of variables, we found that our explanatory vari-
bles play almost no role in explaining regional differences. In
act, a simple simulation based on our regressions shows that
he “adjusted” regional differences are larger than the raw dif-
erences. Another surprising finding is that we do not find a
trong correlation between inflationary history and domestic
ebt share. However, more careful investigation shows that this
nding is due to the presence of capital controls. In countries
ith moderate or no capital controls there is a statistically sig-
ificant negative correlation between domestic debt share and
nflation.
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